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ABSTRACT 
The initial prompt for this paper came early in 1992 when the 
media brought to the public's attention the dilemma of a Maori 
family which had to delay for nearly three weeks the tangihanga of 
a deceased family member while they waited for the dead man's brain 
to be released by the Auckland coroner. Against this background, 
the paper examines what right coroners have to retain body parts, 
concluding that it is a breach of the Coroners Act 1988 for 
incomplete bodies to be returned to families. The paper then 
explores the legal options which families have when the wrongful or 
unnecessary retention of body parts occurs. These include 
subjecting the coroner's decision to retain body parts to judicial 
review, invoking various civil law sanctions and submitting a claim 
to the Waitangi Tribunal on the ground that retention may be in 
breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Finally, the 
paper canvasses possible ways of reforming coronial law and 
practice in order to prevent body parts from being wrongfully or 
unnecessarily retained and to strengthen the position of families 
as they confront the coronial system. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 11,800 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Unti l recently New Zealand's coronial legislation failed to 
address the diverging cultural and spiritual values of New 
Zealand ' s multicultural society, thereby reaping decades of "real 
anguish" 1 for Maori , as well as for other ethnic and religious 
groups. By enacting the Coroners Act 1988
2 the legislature 
s ought to bring the nation's coronial law up to date in terms of 
cultural awareness. 
Of particular concern was the increasingly vexatious problem 
o f what was considered to be unreasonable delay in the releas e 
o f bodies for burial. 3 Parliament's response t o this matt e r was 
threefo ld. Firstly, it directed that coroners deciding whether 
o r no t to authorise a post-mortem examination must consider:
4 
[t)he desirab i lity of minimising the causing o f 
distress to persons who , by reason o f their e thn ic 
origins , social attitudes o r customs, o r s piritual 
bel i efs , customarily require bodies to be available t o 
fam i ly members as soon as is poss i ble after death . 
Secondly , if a coroner decides to authori s e an ex aminat i on ev en 
though these ethnic, social o r spiritual fact o rs apply , t hen a 
new a nd controversial prov ision requires t he cor oner to expedi te 
t he examination by direc ting a doct o r to "perform it 
forthwith". 5 Thirdly, as soon as a coroner is s ati s fied t hat it 
1 Hon. Peter Tapsell, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 
Vol 482, 1987: 10433. 
2 Parts I and III of the Act are reproduced in the 
Appendix. 
3 See the Final Report of the Working Party on Delay s in 
the Release of Bodies for Burial (Department o f Justi c e, 
Wellington, 1984). 
4 Section 8(e), Coroners Act 1988. 
5 Section 9, Coroners Act 1988. The controversy centred on 
c oroners being given the power to order a post-mortem 
"forthwith" and what that meant exactly. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSIT-Y OF WELLINGTOil 
2 
is no longer necessary to withhold a body from family members, 
the coroner is now directed to authorise its disposal "forthwith". 6 
Parliament was also aware that a communication breakdown 
between coroners and grieving families had been silently fuelling 
"ignorance and frustration" . 7 To overcome this the Act now 
requires a coroner, as soon as is practicable, to take all 
reasonable steps to ensure that a member of the immediate family 
is notified that a post-mortem examination has been authorised 
and of the reasons for authorising it. 8 
The new Act was hailed by parliamentarians as significant 
legislation that finally gave "substance" to "the cries of the 
Maori people", 9 while its degree of cultural sensitivity was 
said to offer a lesson for other countries. 10 After a fledgling 
life of three and a half years, assessment o f its success is 
mixed. Officials within the coronial system maintain that by a nd 
large the Act is working well and give the impression that 
problems that exist are minor and incidental. 11 There a re 
others, dealing with the system from the outside, who are not so 
convinced. They allege that delays are still occurring and the 
6 Section 14, Coroners Act 1988. However, the section i s 
subject to s 13(3) so that a coroner who decides not to 
authorise a post-mortem shall not authori s e disposal o f a body 
"earlier than 24 hours after notifying a member of the Poli c e 
o f the decision, unless a member o f the Poli c e of the rank o f 
Senior Sergeant or above agrees". 
7 Above n 3 , 21 . 
8 Section 11, Coroners Act 1988. 
9 Dr Gregory, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vo l 490, 
1988: 5162. 
10 Above n 9, 5162. 
1 1 For example, during the recent furore over the Auckland 
coroner who retained the brain of a dead Maori man, Darci 
Eketone, the Minister of Justice, Doug Graham, was keen not to 
get the issue "out of proportion". "There are a great number 
of [autopsies] each year and there seems to be relatively few 
complaints." See transcript of National Radio's "Morning 
Report" programme, 2YA, 7:14 a.m., 9 March 1992, 4. 
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recent controversy12 in Auckland over the removal and retention 
of body parts is evidence that gaps in communication are still 
a source of anguish and distress. Moreover, the acrimony of that 
debate highlighted a long-simmering dissatisfaction with aspects 
of coronial practice and law that the 1988 reforms apparently did 
not address. This paper details that dissatisfaction and examines 
what rights coroners13 have to retain body parts in light of the 
Coroners Act 1988. The discussion then surveys remedies that 
might be available if the retention of body parts does occur 
contrary to the Act. Finally, various reform options that might 
solve the problems associated with the retention of body parts 
are considered. 
II CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
The state takes a vital interest in ascertaining, as 
precisely as possible, the cause of all deaths so that suspicions 
of foul play, homicide or neglect of human life can be fully 
investigated, and dangerous or negligent practices that have cost 
human life can be modified or eliminated. 14 This interest 
provides the foundations of twentieth century coronership15 and 
is given statutory recognition in the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act 1951. Section 25(4) of that Act requires doctors 
to report forthwith to a coroner all deaths occurring "under any 
12 Above n 11. 
13 For the purposes of this paper a coroner is treated as 
retaining the body parts even though it is the pathologist 
performing the autopsy who makes the clinical decision to do 
so and who has physical possession of them. 
14 Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on the Coroner 
System in Ontario (Department of Justice, Toronto, 1971) 29. 
15 The coroner's role was originally almost purely fiscal, 
ie to safeguard certain financial interests of the Crown that 
arose from sudden deaths. For the historical development of 
the office of the coroner see SM Roberts "Who Habeas The 
Corpus? A Review of Coroners and Coronial Law in New Zealand" 
(LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1985) 
and G Thurston Coronership (Barry Rose Publishers, UK, 1976). 
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circumstances of suspicion", while section 4 of the Coroners Act 
1988 further reinforces this by listing certain deaths that must 
be reported to the Police and thence to a coroner. These include 
deaths without a known cause, unnatural or violent deaths, 
s uicides, deaths occurring while the person concerned was 
undergoing a medical, surgical or dental operation or procedure, 
and deaths in prisons or mental hospitals. 
While most deaths do not fall within the scope of these 
s ections and therefore do not come within the coroner's 
jurisdiction, those that do very commonly result in a post-mortem 
examination in order to establish the cause of death. Typically 
t his involves "a gross examination o f the exterior o f t he body 
for any abnormality or trauma and a careful inspection of the 
interior of the body and its organs". 16 It may also include "the 
recovery of foreign objects, the collection of vaginal 
washings, the taking of hair samples, and the laboratory 
study of trace evidence such as fingernail scrapings or stains 
on clothing" . 17 
Small samples of tissue18 are invariably taken from each 
important organ for microscopy and analysis. Blood and urine 
s amples may also be taken, 19 particularly if drugs or alcohol 
a re suspected elements of the death. Only rarely is there reason 
to retain an organ. However, a pathologist may wish to keep the 
heart of a deceased for further examination if there is evidence 
of congenital heart disease. Similarly, a pathologist may wish 
to retain a brain if, in a homicide inquiry, the deceased has a 
1 6 Above n 3 , 8 . 
17 FA Jaffe "Some Limitations of the Medico-Legal Post-
mortem Examination" (1974-1975) 17 The Criminal Law Quarterly 
178, 178-179. 
18 In most cases this is a slice of tissue two millimetres 
thick and 15 millimetres square. Normally, the largest sample 
of tissue required is 100 grams of liver. 
19 The average sample of blood is ten millimetres, while 
15 to 20 millimetres of urine is generally taken. 
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history of previous head injury and the cause of death cannot be 
determined conclusively from the current injury or if there is 
a suspicion of contributing factors. 20 
Critics of the present regime have no quarrel with the 
state's interest in ensuring that the cause of all deaths is 
accurately determined and recorded. 21 They do question, however, 
those occasions when pathologists retain an organ for further 
examination, to be returned at some future time. 22 In such 
c ircumstances the family of the deceased is left to bury an 
incomplete body or is obliged to delay burial until the body part 
is returned. 
For Maori, "the most sacred part of a person's body is [the] 
brain", 23 hence the visceral objection when it is retained. 
Likewise, "Maori people believe that after death the spirit does 
not depart immediately, but is available for a time to be spoken 
to" . 24 Custom holds "that relatives should embrace the body as 
soon as possible after death" . 25 These cultural dictates, 
realised and observed during the tangihanga, are abused when a 
burial is deferred pending the return of body parts. There are 
also economic consequences when a tangihanga is delayed, with the 
large numbers of mourners arriving for it having to be fed and 
20 Information provided by Dr Ken Thomson, the pathologist 
employed by the Wellington coroner. 
21 See, for example, statements by Moana Jackson in "Body 
parts dispute sparks concern" The Evening Post, Wellington, 
New Zealand, 11 March 1992, 30. 
22 Allegations have been made that " [ i] n one case body 
parts were not returned for two years and in another case they 
were not returned at all". Above n 21. 
23 "Body parts dispute sparks concern" The Evening Post, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 11 March 1992, 30. 
2 4 Above n 1, 10433. 
25 Above n 1, 10433. 
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housed. 26 
Recently, a spokesperson from the Samoan community also 
publicly criticised the retention of body parts as being 
"insensitive" to, and "inconsiderate" of, their cultural 
va lues. 27 Orthodox Jews have voiced their abhorrence, too. 28 
III IS RETENTION PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE CORONERS ACT 1988? 
i) Bodies 
In common with its predecessors the present Coroners Act ha s 
no explicit provision giving coroners the right to retain a body. 
It has been said, however, that "in appropriate cases", the right 
1s a "sine qua non [of the coroner's] duty to inquire into t he 
death" . 29 At Common Law, therefore, the right "arises as soon as 
the report reaches the coroner that a person has been killed or 
has died violently, and remains until the conclusion o f the 
inquest" . 30 
Section 14 of New Zealand's Coroners Act now qual i fies thi s 
by requiring a coroner to authorise f o rthwith the disposal o f a 
body if she or he is satisfied that it is no l onger neces sary to 
withhold it from family members. 31 Thus, once a coroner's post -
mortem has been completed the family will normally be entitled 
to have the body returned to it. Exceptions may occur where the 
26 Hon. Mrs TWM Tirikatene-Sullivan, New Zealand 
Parliamentary Debates Vol 482, 1987: 10434 . 
27 Above n 23. 
28 Above n 23. 
29 KM Walker Coronial Law and Practice in New South Wales 
(2 ed, The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 1982) 178 . 
30 R v Bristol Coroner, ex parte Kerr [1974] 2 All ER 719, 
722. 
31 Subject to s 13(3), see above n 6. 
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deceased is the subject of a homicide inquiry. In such cases a 
coroner would have to take account of defence counsel's wishes 
to exercise the right to call for its own pathological 
examination before releasing the body for burial. 32 
Unnecessary retention of a body by a coroner is therefore 
in contravention of the Act, although Parliament has provided no 
sanction to be imposed on an errant coroner in this specific 
respect. 33 
ii) Body parts 
Section 2 of the Coroners Act 1988 defines "body" to mean 
"a dead person, and includes- (a) Any part of a person without 
which no person can live ... ". For the reasons that follow, it 
is submitted that this statutory definition should be interpreted 
to mean that when a coroner orders the release of a body, either 
under section 13 or section 14 of the Coroners Act, all essential 
organs must be returned with the body since they are, by 
definition, an integral part of it. 
Firstly, in defining "body" Parliament has used clear words 
that are unambiguous. Although in our ordinary use of language 
we might refer to a corpse as a "body" even if essential organs 
have been removed, the fact that Parliament has chosen to give 
its own meaning to the word suggests that ordinary usage is not 
applicable here. 
32 In R v Bristol Coroner, ex parte Kerr, above n 30, the 
right was recognised but no authority was given for it. Text 
writers are similarly vague with respect to the authoritative 
basis of the right. See, eg, G Thurston Coronership, above n 
15, 131. 
33 But a person who fails or refuses to comply with a 
coroner 's direction to dispose of the body would arguably 
commit an offence as outlined ins 43(2) of the Coroners Act. 
For this conclusion to hold, however, s 14 must be read in 
conjunction with s 13. 
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Secondly, this interpretation is consonant with the 
reformist spirit of the Act that endeavours to accommodate the 
diverse cultural and religious values of society's members. 
Although the specific issue of coroners retaining body parts was 
not mentioned during the parliamentary debates of the Coroners 
Bill, it clearly comes within the mischief that Parliament sought 
to reduce or eliminate when it enacted the new legislation. 
Thirdly, acceptance of this interpretation would not impede 
the coroner's duty to ascertain the cause of death. In practice 
it is only when further examination of a brain is desired that 
substantial delays should be expected to occur. 3 4 Although in 
neuropathology the classic fixation period for a brain is three 
weeks, according to Dr Ken Thomson35 procedures can be adapted 
in order to reduce this period to four or five days by using 
extra-strength formalin. Once set, representative slices can be 
taken for analysis and the bulk of the brain can be returned for 
burial with the rest of the body. Although rapid fixation is not 
as good as when the longer time is taken, Dr Thomson describes 
this as "not really a problem" - acceptable standards of accuracy 
can still be achieved. 
Fourthly, any contention that this interpretation would lead 
to the absurd result that less important body parts could be 
retained by a coroner, but not those "without which no person can 
live" lacks practical substance. It is only major organs that are 
the focus of autopsies, and only ever the heart or brain that is 
needed for further examination. Moreover, it is possible to read 
into the Act a requirement that coroners permit no more 
"interference" with a body than is necessary for the performance 
of their duties. A coroner who retained a minor body part would 
3 4 The heart, the other organ likely to be retained for 
further examination, sets in formalin within two to three 
days. 
35 Above n 20. 
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be in breach of this unwritten rule. 36 
If this view is accepted there is no legal basis for 
c oroners returning an incomplete body, at least not one lacking 
a major organ such as the heart or the brain and upon which human 
life depends. 37 Failure to do so will mean a breach of the Act, 
though again no penalty has been provided for such violations. 
It could be contended, however, that the introductory words 
o f section 2 "unless the context otherwise requires" - are 
intended to allow for a different approach in those situations 
where a pathologist deems it desirable to retain an organ for 
f urther examination but has no further need for the rest of the 
corpse. To hold otherwise would mean pathologists having to 
r etain the complete corpse until the examination of all body 
parts is completed. This might create inconvenience for families 
which do not wish to leave the body unattended prio r to the 
burial and where mortuary facilities lack adequate viewing o r 
waiting facilities for relatives. For these families, however, 
this inconvenience will arise regardless of which interpretation 
is chosen. In practice it should occur only rarely but, where it 
does, it demands the modernisation and humanisati on o f sub-
s tandard facilities rather than betraying the s pirit of 
s ensitiv ity that the Ac t seeks t o engender. 38 
36 This rule does find clear expression in the Human 
Tissue Act 1964, however; s 11 prohibits "unnecessary 
mutilation" of a body during a post-mortem carried out under 
that Act. It is also an offence under s 150 of the Crimes Act 
1 961 to "improperly or indecently interfere with ... any dead 
human body". Doctors carrying out c oronial post - mortems do not 
escape the effect of this provision. 
37 But, for the reasons given, retention of any other body 
part would not be permissible either. 
38 Most of New Zealand's major mortuary facilities provide 
viewing and waiting rooms for relatives. If necessary, it 
would be within a coroner's powers under s 13(1) of the 
Coroners Act to have a body moved to a mortuary that is 
s uitably equipped for relatives. 
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Other families those which require the burial of the 
corpse as soon as possible after death39 - may be inconvenienced 
in a different way if body parts are not to be seen as separable 
from the rest of the corpse. Instead of immediately proceeding 
with the burial of the corpse and burying any body parts that 
have been retained when they are subsequently returned by the 
coroner, these families will be forced to delay burial until the 
complete "body" is returned. Al though these counter-arguments 
have a measure of force and generate some sympathy, each raises 
the question of the status that the retained body parts would 
have under the Coroners Act since, for the purposes of the Act, 
the "body" would have been returned to the family for disposal 
under section 13 (2) or section 14. 40 It is submitted that in 
these situations the retained body parts would no longer be under 
the cover of the Act, having fallen into a jurisdictional void. 
If that is the case then the coroner's right to possession and 
examination of the parts would be in doubt, as might be the 
family's right to seek the return of the parts since they have 
already been returned the "body". An answer to this conundrum 
might be that here the Act envisages the retained body part to 
be regarded as the, or another, "body". It is suggested that an 
interpretation that has the absurd result of either allowing 
retained body parts to escape the ambit of the Act, or of making 
two bodies out of one, is worthy of rejection. 
39 This is required by Orthodox Jews, for example; above n 
23. 
40 If body parts can be separated from the rest of the 
corpse then s 13(1) might offer a partial solution to the 
first inconvenience. It reads: "For the purposes of any 
examination under this Act, a coroner may give any directions 
the coroner thinks fit relating to the removal of a body." 
Thus a coroner could give an order to remove the corpse to a 
funeral parlour, for example, so that family members could be 
with it, while a body part was retained by the coroner for 
further examination. However, there could be some doubt as to 
whether such a removal would be "for the purpose of an 
examination" as the section requires. Nor would this section 
alleviate the more troublesome situation where a corpse is 
r equired to be buried as soon as possible after death, since 
it does not authorise the disposal of the body, only its 
removal. 
11 
Rather, the words "unless the context otherwise requires" 
more appropriately cater for those situations where incomplete 
human remains have been discovered and an autopsy has been 
a uthorised. For the purposes of the Coroners Act such remains are 
t hereby deemed to be a "body" . In other cases, however, the 
"body" includes, meaning that it is inseparable from, "any part 
without which no person can live". 
This interpretation is supported by the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, which, by virtue of section 3(b), applies to the 
work of coroners and doctors performing post-mortems. Section ·20 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act states that: 
a person who belongs to an ethnic , [ or J religious ... 
minority in New Zealand sha l l not be den i ed the right , 
in community with other members of that minority , to 
enjoy the culture , [or] to profess and practise the 
religion , . .. of that minority. 
Section 5 of the Act contains an important proviso, permitting 
s uch, but only such, "reasonable limits [to the Bill of Rights] 
p rescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society". The state's right to perform a post-mortem 
examination on the body of a dead person in order to precisely 
a scertain the cause of death has already been s een to be a 
justifiable limitation on the rights of mourning families to 
proceed immediately with the burial. However, it is submitted 
that if the Coroners Act can be interpreted so as t o accommodate 
the ethnic or religious beliefs and practices of minority groups 
without unduly restricting or compromising the legitimate role 
o f coroners, then the effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act is that that interpretation "shall be preferred" 41 • The 
s uggested interpretation of "body" in section 2 of the Coroners 
Act satisfies both conditions; that is, it goes furthest in 
meeting the beliefs and practices of minority groups without 
unduly hampering coronial practice. 
41 Section 6, New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
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IV PREVENTION AND REDRESS UNDER CURRENT LAW 
It is submitted that the Coroners Act 1988 does not allow 
coroners to return incomplete bodies, a conclusion that turns on 
a particular interpretation of the statutory definition of 
"body". Even if this interpretation is rejected, most people 
would accept that the unnecessary retention of body parts is 
highly objectionable and would agree that mechanisms should be 
available to prevent this from occurring and, furthermore, that 
means of redress should exist if it does occur. This part of the 
paper considers potential options for prevention and redress 4 2 
that could be argued within the confines of present law and 
precedent when the retention of body parts occurs wrongfully4 3 
or unnecessarily. The discussion relies upon some elasticity in 
these confines, however. 
For the sake of analysis (where it matters), it is to be 
presumed that the statutory interpretation argued for in Part III 
of this paper is correct and that the Coroners Act is contravened 
when incomplete bodies are returned. (Nevertheless, some mention 
is made of the consequences if the contrary interpretation is 
preferred.) It is not the intention of this discussion to uncover 
and address all the intricacies of law and circumstance that have 
the potential to arise, but to survey, in broad outline rather 
than in detail, the possible remedies that currently exist when 
coroners retain body parts. 
42 As in other areas of law these two issues are not 
easily separated - the fact that a legally cognisable and 
enforceable remedy is available upon the commission or 
omission of a certain act is generally perceived as one means 
of preventing the commission or omission of that act in the 
first place. 
43 Wrongfully, that is, in the sense that body parts have 
been retained and an incomplete corpse has been returned to 
the family. 
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i) Judicial Review 
Judicial review proceedings can be brought against a coroner 
who has exceeded his or her jurisdiction or has acted without 
jurisdiction. 44 45 The statutory procedure for review is an 
application under section 4 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 
First, however, the initial hurdle of standing would have to be 
overcome. No difficulty would arise for the executors of the 
deceased since they have a duty to dispose of the body. 46 If the 
deceased died intestate standing could be achieved by one or more 
persons with an interest in the deceased applying for letters of 
administration under section 6 of the Administration Act 1969. 
Such an application was made in Re Tupuna Maori. 47 The 
applicant was constituted a personal representative of the 
deceased so that legal proceedings could be commenced "for the 
limited purpose of according the deceased a proper burial 
according to Maori law and custom and to prevent, as far as 
possible, further indignity being visited upon him". 48 Despite 
the unusual facts of that case, including the absence of any 
testamentary dispositions and there being no other persons who 
could have had a right to a grant of administration, it would 
provide some support for an application made for the same narrow 
44 Sees 35 of the Coroners Act 1988 and s 193(1) of the 
Summary Proceedings Act 1957. 
45 It should be noted that although there may be some 
conceptual difficulty or artificiality in doing so, the courts 
generally follow the wide meaning of "jurisdiction''. Thus, all 
errors in the decision-making process tend to be treated as 
ultra vires rather than as errors made within jurisdiction. 
See HWR Wade Administrative Law (6 ed, OUP, New York, 1988) 
39-44. 
46 R v Fox (1841) 2 QB 246; Williams v Williams [1882] 20 
Ch D 659, 664; Murdoch v Rhind [1945] NZLR 425. See also 
Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed, Butterworths, London, 1980) 
vol 10, Cremation and Burial, para 1017, p 486. 
47 Unreported, 19 May 1988, High Court Wellington Registry 
P 580/88. 
48 Above n 4 7 , 4 . 
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purpose, namely to secure a proper burial. Even if the deceased 
did not die intestate it might be possible for a family member 
to seek letters of administration if solely for that purpose. 
Where body parts have been retained the following decisions 
could be usefully attacked in judicial review proceedings: the 
initial decision whether or not to authorise a post-mortem 
examination under section 8 of the Coroners Act, and the decision 
to release the body under section 14 of the Act. 
Section 8 lists various criteria which must be considered 
when the decision to authorise a post-mortem examination is made. 
It could be argued that relevant considerations were not taken 
into account that should have been, that irrelevant 
considerations were taken into account that should not have been, 
or that the decision was unreasonable. 4 9 The relief sought could 
be an order of certiorari with a declaration that the decision 
to authorise a post-mortem was defective, presumably with the 
result that the body be returned to the family, or an order of 
mandamus, similarly requiring the return of the body. 
There would be considerable difficulty in supporting such 
contentions with sufficient evidence. This difficulty would be 
compounded by a predictable unwillingness of the court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the coroner's, particularly 
given the specialised nature of the coroner's work, the 
undesirability of what might be perceived to be the fettering of 
49 Traditionally "unreasonableness" in Administrative Law 
has had a high threshold as expounded by Lord Greene in 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation 
[1948] 1 KB 223, 229: "[the] decision on a competent matter 
[must be] so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could 
ever have come to it". Indications of a lower threshold have 
recently appeared, however; in Webster v Auckland Harbour 
Board [1987] 2 NZLR 129 Cooke P stated (at p 131) that "[a]n 
unreasonable decision, in an ordinary sense, is one outside 
the limits of reason. Or, in other words, one which no 
reasonable person could reach." Nevertheless, the higher 
threshold remains in ascendancy in New Zealand, having been 
affirmed by the Privy Council in Petrocorp Exploration Ltd v 
Minister of Energy [1991] 1 NZLR 641. 
15 
coronial practice, and the fact that the statute is silent as to 
what weight should be given to the individual criteria that are 
listed in section 8. 
The family could also question whether a coroner's decision 
to return the body complied with section 14 of the Coroners Act. 
The section requires a coroner to authorise the disposal of the 
body as soon as she is satisfied that it is no longer necessary 
to withhold it from family members, subject to the requirements 
of section 13(3) . 50 Two scenarios are possible here. The first 
is where a coroner retains body parts (the heart or brain, for 
example) but returns the rest of the body to the family (thereby 
breaching the Act); the second where the body parts are retained 
for further examination, thus causing the rest of the body to be 
retained as well. 
In the first scenario the decision to return an incomplete 
body is open to attack on the ground that the meaning of "body" 
in the Coroners Act precludes the physical separation of a "dead 
person" and "any part of a dead person without which no person 
can live". If a court were to uphold that interpretation then 
there would be no difficulty in finding that a coroner acted in 
excess of the powers granted under the Act by returning an 
incomplete body. 
In the second scenario judicial review would concentrate on 
whether retention of the body parts (causing the withholding of 
the body) is "necessary". Again there would be considerable 
difficulty in amassing sufficient evidence to convincingly 
support such a claim. The Act's failure to provide guidance as 
to what "necessary" entails makes the task even harder. 
50 See above n 6. Section 13(2) also concerns the 
coroner 's powers to authorise disposal of the body but its 
permissive language oddly contrad~cts the mandatory statement 
of section 14. 
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ii) Tort Law Remedies 
Although section 35 of the Coroners Act awards coroners II the 
powers, privileges, authorities, and inununities of a District 
Court Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Sununary Proceedings 
Act 1957 11 , coroners who unnecessarily retain body parts could 
still be vulnerable to actions in tort. Judicial inununity only 
extends to the execution of judicial acts, 51 whereas coroners 
engage in both judicial and administrative functions. It is 
submitted that a coroner's decision to retain body parts falls 
within the latter category with no such inununity attaching to it. 
In any event, coroners who act outside their jurisdiction or 
without jurisdiction are not inunune from civil actions - like 
judges of the inferior courts, they are "liable in damages for 
any injury so caused" . 52 Although, here, "jurisdiction" is said 
to be used "in a wider sense than for the purposes of the ultra 
vires doctrine ... requir[ing] something like 'some gross and 
obvious irregularity of procedure' 11 , 53 an act in clear 
contravention of the Coroners Act (such as the unnecessary 
retention of body parts) could well be said to come within that 
wider meaning. 54 In light of this, the following tort law 
51 Nakhla V McCarthy [1978] 1 NZLR 291, 299. 
52 Wade, above n 45, 784. See also H Street Street on 
Torts (7 ed, Butterworths, London, 1983) 87. However, coroners 
are indemnified by the Crown for any damages or costs entered 
against them; sees 196A of the Sununary Proceedings Act 1957. 
53 Above n 45, 784. 
54 In the United States, at least, a coroner has been sued 
in negligence, albeit unsuccessfully. See Gray v Southern Pac. 
Co et al 68 P (2 ed) 1011 (1937), discussed briefly below 
Part IV (ii) (a). In England, pathologists who performed a 
post-mortem at the request of the police were amongst the 
defendants sued, inter alia, for negligently conducting the 
post-mortem and preparing the subsequent report; Evans v 
London Hospital Medical College and others [1981] 1 All ER 
715. In this case, however, the defendants were covered by the 
absolute inununity from any form of civil action conferred on 
witnesses in criminal proceedings in respect of their 
evidence. This inununity, it is submitted, would not attach to 
a coroner in New Zealand who wrongfully or unnecessarily 
retained body parts. 
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remedies offer possible redress. 
a) Interference with the right to possession of the corpse for 
buria1 55 
The law does not recognise property in a corpse56 but it 
does recognise "as incident to the duty to dispose of the body 
rights to the possession of the body until it is disposed of 
[footnote omitted]" . 57 The right is not absolute58 and it may 
be obliged to yield, perhaps temporarily, to the rights of others 
who have a legitimate interest in the body for which possession 
is necessary or desirable. Thus, when a coronial post-mortem 
examination is authorised the coroner's right to possession59 
temporarily subordinates the executor's right to possession. 
Arguably , however, a coroner's right only exists in so far as he 
or she acts intra vires; a coroner who acts ultra vires whilst 
in possession of the body ( or a part thereof) would thereby 
55 For a discussion of this tort in the context of the 
removal of cadaveric transplant material contrary to the 
provisions of the Human Tissue Act 1961 (UK) see PDG Skegg 
"Liability for the Unauthorised Removal of Cadaveric 
Transplant Material" (1974) 14 Medicine, Science and the Law 
53, 54; PDG Skegg "Liability for the Unauthorised Removal of 
Cadaveric Transplant Material: Some Further Comments" (1977) 
17 Medicine, Science and the Law 123, 123-124; and I Kennedy 
Treat Me Right (OUP, New York, 1988) 226-227. 
56 Dr Handyside's case 2 East PC 652; R v Lynn (1788) 2 TR 
733 ; R v Sharpe (1856-1857) Dears & Bell 160; Foster v Dodd 
(1866) LR 1 QB 475; Williams v Williams above n 46; R v Price 
[1884] 12 WBD 247. See also Halsbury's Laws of England above n 
46, para 1019, p 487-488. The point is discussed in more 
detail below Part V (iii). 
57 Halsbury's Laws of England, above n 46, para 1019, pp 
487-488. See also Williams v Williams, above n 46. 
58 Edmonds v Armstrong Funeral Home Ltd [1931] 1 DLR 676, 
680 . 
59 As has been noted the Coroners Act does not explicitly 
give coroners the right to retain a body but it can be said to 
be, in "appropriate cases" a "sine qua non [of the coroner's] 
duty to inquire into the death". Above n 29. 
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invalidate the right to possession. In this latter situation the 
person under the duty to dispose of the body could argue that the 
c oroner has interfered with his or her right to possession of the 
body for the purpose of burial. 
Interference with this right was successfully argued in 
Edmonds v Armstrong Funeral Home Ltci6° before the Alberta 
Supreme Court. The plaintiff sued for general damages on the 
basis of an (apparently non-coronial) unauthorised post-mortem 
that was performed upon his deceased wife's body. Portions of the 
body were removed during the post-mortem. According to Harvey CJA 
the claim succeeded because the defendants' acts "constituted a 
v iolation of the plaintiff's right of custody and control". 61 
The plaintiff was not required to prove actual damage or to show 
that he had actually been unable to dispose of the body because 
o f the defendants' acts - the mere interference with the right 
to possession for the purpose of burial was an injury giving rise 
to a cause of action. 62 In Gray v Southern Pac. Co et al 63 the 
Californian District Court of Appeal also recognised that 
interference with the right to possession of a corpse for burial 
can form the basis of legal action. In that case the interference 
was the unnecessary retention of body parts following a coronial 
post-mortem. The action failed, however, partly on account of 
erroneous pleadings 6 4 and partly because "such violation could 
give rise to no more than nominal damages and the court would 
not be justified in reversing the judgment for the purpose of 
60 Above n 58. 
6 1 Above n 58, 681. 
62 Above n 58, 680-681. 
63 Above n 54. 
6 4 Apparently the plaintiff had claimed a right to 
possession of "her deceased husband's body for the purpose of 
decent burial free of mutilation by an autopsy thereon" (above 
n 54, 1015) whereas the Court had found the autopsy to have 
been a lawful one. 
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procuring such an award" . 65 
Thus, where a coroner has retained body parts ultra vires 
it would be open to the person with the right to possession for 
the purpose of burial to allege interference with that right. 
Such an action would be novel in New Zealand but the decisions 
in Edmonds 66 and Gray°7 would lend it valuable support. It 
should be noted, however, that the judgment in Edmonds68 appears 
to give more weight to the right of possession than to the 
purpose for which that right exists. 69 Another court might 
construe the right more strictly, requiring a plaintiff to show 
that the interference actually impeded the plaintiff from burying 
the deceased. On the other hand, this may not be a difficult task 
to do, particularly for those families whose beliefs prohibit the 
burial of an incomplete body or for whom immediate burial is 
important. 
If, contrary to the submission of this paper, it were deemed 
permissible for a coroner to retain body parts and return the 
rest of the corpse, a court might also question whether the duty 
to bury extends to the duty to bury with no parts missing. 70 It 
is submitted that this should be seen not as a question of law 
but as a question of fact to be answered by the cultural or 
religious values of the deceased and the deceased' s family. 
Maori, for instance, would assuredly consider it their duty to 
bury a complete body (or, at least, all the parts of a body that 
are known to still exist) 
65 Above n 54, 1015. 
66 Above n 58. 
67 Above n 54. 
68 Above n 58. 
69 See Skegg ( 1977) I above n 55, 124. 
70 See Kennedy, above n 55, 227. 
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b) Negligently causing nervous shock or emotional harm71 
It is highly unlikely that the tort of intentionally 
inflicting emotional harm would apply where a coroner wrongfully 
or unnecessarily retains body parts, but there is some scope for 
an action based in negligence. 72 Kennedy's consideration of an 
action arising out of the tort of "negligently causing nervous 
shock by the removal of tissue without authority" 73 offers a 
parallel to the situation where a coroner exceeds his or her 
jurisdiction by retaining body parts, thus causing nervous shock 
or emotional harm to a plaintiff. For an action to succeed it 
would have to be established that the coroner owed a duty to the 
plaintiff, that the duty was breached by the coroner and that 
damage arose from that breach. 
In establishing a duty of care New Zealand's courts 
undertake "two broad fields of inquiry" . 74 The first considers 
"the degree of proximity or relationship between the alleged 
wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage" . 75 It is 
submitted that members of the deceased's family, but perhaps 
close friends of the deceased as well, would satisfy this 
inquiry, these being persons so closely and directly affected by 
the coroner's actions that the coroner should reasonably have had 
71 For a discussion of this tort in the context of the 
removal of cadaveric transplant material contrary to the Human 
Tissue Act 1961 (UK) see Skegg (1977) above n 55, 124; and 
Kennedy above n 55, 227-228. 
72 The definition of "accident" ins 3 of the new Accident 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (requiring 
"[a] specific event or series of events that involves the 
application of force or resistance external to the human body 
and that results in personal injury") means that such claims 
are no longer barred in New Zealand. 
73 Kennedy above n 55, 227-228. 
74 South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand 
Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282, 
294. 
75 Above n 7 4, 2 94. 
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them in her contemplation when directing her mind to the 
retention of the body parts. 76 This is particularly so given the 
strong emotional ties that such people would have with the 
deceased, particularly surrounding the time of death and burial. 
Furthermore, it is generally family members who are under the 
duty to bury the deceased and whose right to possession of the 
corpse has yielded only temporarily to that of the coroner. 
The second inquiry in establishing a duty of care asks 
"whether there are other policy considerations tending to 
negative or restrict the duty in that class of case" . 77 Although 
the courts would be reluctant to fetter coronial discretion, it 
is submitted that they should not defer uncritically to one 
side's point of view. Nor could there be any realistic fear of 
a flood of litigation by allowing such a cause of action - few 
meritorious cases would probably arise but where they do they 
should not be precluded from proceeding. 
On this basis therefore, a duty of care could arguably be 
establ ished. Breach of the duty must also be proven by the 
plaintif f by showing that retention of the body parts was indeed 
wrongful or unnecessary. Proving the latter, however, could be 
difficult - some of the problems confronting a plaintiff in doing 
this have already been alluded to. 78 
Difficulties could also arise in persuading a court to 
accept a claim solely for emotional harm. However, while "the 
great majority of courts "79 have denied recovery of damages 
where only mental disturbance occurs, unaccompanied by adverse 
physical consequences, a number of cases involving the negligent 
mishandling of corpses have emerged in the United States as an 
76 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932) AC 562. 
77 Above n 7 4 , 2 9 4 . 
78 Above Part IV ( i) 
79 WP Keeton (ed) Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 
(5 ed, West Pub. Co, St Paul, Minn., 1984) 361. 
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exception to the traditional rule. 80 It has been sai d that the 
common element in these cases "is an especial likelihood of 
genuine and serious mental distress arising from the special 
circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not 
spurious " . 81 
There is also now high New Zealand authority82 for awarding 
damages where a breach of a duty of care leads solely to 
inconvenience, worry and stress which were reasonably foreseeable 
a t the time of the breach. On the other hand, it remains to be 
seen whether this approach will be adopted unreservedly. In any 
particular case the courts may still opt for a more conservative 
approach and seek a "recognizable, psychiatric illness [footnote 
omitted] "83 in the plaintiff as a minimum indication of injury, 
a lthough such an illness could be in the form of anxiety or 
depression. 8 4 Proving causation would also be problematic since 
it is probable that a plaintiff would already be suffering 
considerable emotional strain from the fact of t he death. It 
would be difficult to say with the desired certainty that it was 
t he coroner's action that caused the emotional harm, and not the 
death itself, and a court would be likely to retreat from having 
to make such a conclusion. 
c) Economic l oss 
Situations can occur where the retention of body parts 
results in economic loss to the family of the deceased. For 
example, in a Maori family the elder brother of a deceased is 
r equired by custom to remain constantly by the corpse to keep it 
80 Above n 79, 362. 
81 Above n 79, 362. 
82 Mouat V Clark Boyce [1992] 2 NZLR 559 (CA). 
83 Kennedy above n 55, 228. 
8 4 Kennedy above n 55, 228. 
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"warm". Such a vigil may result in time having to be taken off 
work, resulting in a loss of earnings for that family member. 
Furthermore, large numbers of mourners may have to be 
accommodated and fed, at considerable financial cost to the 
deceased's family, if the tangihanga is delayed. If retention of 
the body parts is wrongful or unnecessary then the coroner may 
be liable in negligence for the resulting economic loss. 
It has already been seen that family members ought to 
reasonably come within a coroner's contemplation when considering 
whether to retain body parts, although certain factors make it 
difficult to establish a breach of that duty to take care. 85 In 
an action based on negligently causing economic loss a further 
impediment to success might be the charge that the loss is too 
remote - that it was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
the coroner's decision. However, if it were considered reasonable 
to expect a coroner to be familiar with Maori custom, it follows 
that it would be reasonable for a coroner to foresee the 
possibility of a family member having to remain with the corpse 
until its burial. Therefore, if delay of the burial is prolonged, 
it is foreseeable that the family member's obligation to remain 
with the body is likely to have financial consequences. 
Similarly, if the burial is delayed it may be possible to contend 
that a coroner should have reasonably foreseen the likelihood of 
t he deceased' s family having to accommodate and feed large 
numbers of mourners, or at least the closer family members, until 
the tangihanga could proceed. 
Although the action would be based on pure economic loss, 
(or economic loss in conjunction with emotional harm), without 
accompanying physical harm, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has 
indicated a willingnes s to uphold such actions in deserving 
cases. 86 
85 These are referred to above Part IV (i). 
86 See, eg , Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis [1983] 
NZLR 37, 47: "[t]he duty of care extends to liability for 
foreseeable economic loss regardless of the absence of some 
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d) Breach of statutory duty87 
Section 14 of the Coroners Act imposes a duty on coroners 
to "forthwith authorise" the disposal of a body "as soon as [he 
or she] is satisfied that it is no longer necessary to withhold 
[it] from family members" . 88 A failure to comply with this duty 
(by unnecessarily retaining body parts, for example,) may give 
rise to an action based on the tort of breach of statutory duty. 
This cause of action might also arise where a coroner has 
retained a body part but returned the rest of the corpse, in 
contravention of the implicit duty (which is argued for in this 
paper) not to return incomplete bodies. Only the person to whom 
the duty is owed may bring such an action89 from a 
consideration of the Act as a whole, and the wording of 
appropriate provisions such as section 14, this duty is clearly 
owed to members of the deceased's family. 
The threshold issue would be whether the Act intended to 
give an individual a right of action in tort. 90 In deciding this 
existing tort law remedies are sometimes considered in order to 
determine whether they already cover the circumstances also 
addressed by the statute. 91 Although various tort remedies have 
identifiable physical damage or injury or any identifiable 
danger or threat thereof". 
87 For a discussion of this tort in the context of the 
removal of cadaveric transplant material contrary to the 
provisions of the Human Tissue Act 1961 (UK) see Skegg (1977) 
above n 55, 124; and Kennedy above n 55, 228-230. 
88 The duty is subject to s 13(3), however; see above n 6. 
89 Kennedy, above n 5 5 , 2 2 9 . 
90 Street, above n 52, 282. See also S Todd (ed) The Law 
of Torts in New Zealand (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1991) 
327. Todd notes (at pp 328 and 329) that "in the majority of 
cases the parliamentary intent must be inferred [footnote 
omitted] " and that this test of construction "must involve a 
substantial creative input by the court itself". 
91 Street, above n 52, 282. 
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been discussed above, none has an established basis in New 
Zealand; moreover, each faces substantial difficulties that would 
likely prove fatal if considered by a conservative judge. An 
action for breach of statutory duty should not be disqualified, 
therefore, on the uncertain ground that other tort remedies are 
available to the plaintiff. 
Another relevant factor in deciding the threshold question 
is whether the statute itself expressly provides a sanction for 
the breach of the duty since "[i]t is not to be presumed that 
Parliament would have intended to lay down a duty which is 
unenforceable: it would then be only a pious aspiration [footnote 
omitted]". 92 The provision of an alternative remedy often works 
against the applicability of this tort, though not invariably, 
particularly if the alternative lS, in the circumstances, 
inadequate. 93 While section 43(2) of the Coroners Act does make 
it an offence to fail or refuse to comply with, or to hinder or 
prevent compliance with, directions for the removal and disposal 
o f bodies given under section 13 of the Act, there is no express 
s anction for a breach of section 14 providing for the mandatory 
early release of bodies (subject to section 13(3)) This omission 
i s some evidence that an action for breach of statutory duty 
s hould be permitted to lie. 94 
The plaintiff must also show that the harm s uff e red comes 
within the scope of the general class of risks at which the 
s tatute is directed. 95 There would be little difficulty in 
92 Todd, above n 90, 330. 
9 3 Street, above n 52, 284. 
9 4 Indirectly, however, there is the remedy of judicial 
r eview to test the legality of a coroner's actions (see above 
Part IV (i)) and perhaps also recourse to s 34 of the Coroners 
Act: the removal of a coroner from office for inability or 
misbehaviour. Whether this latter would actually be seen as an 
applicable remedy in these circumstances must be open to 
considerable doubt, however. 
95 Street, above n 52, 285. 
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demonstrating this - for instance, a breach of section 14 by 
unnecessarily delaying the release of a body will often conflict 
with the cultural and religious values of families, heightening 
t heir anxiety and emotional stress. This is in clear conflict 
with a major tenet of the current Act, namely to make the 
coronial system more sensitive to the "ethnic origins, social 
attitudes or customs, or spiritual beliefs" 96 of people making 
up the New Zealand community. 
Given the significant effect that non-compliance with the 
duty would have on family members of the deceased, including 
f inancial as well as emotional consequences, and that the duty 
embodies much of the reformist spirit of the Act, it is submitted 
that a court might well deem it appropriate to allow an action 
f o r breach of statutory duty to lie. 
e) Summary 
None of these tort-based remedies enjoys ready application 
t o a situation where a coroner has wrongfully or unnecessarily 
retained body parts. Nevertheless, each has some potential for 
s uccess and, given the right conditions, may yield positive 
results for particular plaintiffs. Perhaps the most important 
p re-conditions are counsel who are willing to run the a rguments 
a nd a judge both willing to listen to them and prepared to extend 
t he boundaries of the Common Law, if necessary, where the facts 
o f a case merit it. 
It is also hoped that, where applicable, the courts would 
no t adopt an unduly restrictive meaning of "family" for the 
purpose of bringing these actions. 97 Given that the 1988 
96 Section 8(e), Coroners Act 1988. See also ss 8(f), 9 
a nd 14. 
97 It should be noted that the Coroners Act itself refers 
to both "family members" and "immediate family" at different 
t imes; compare ss 9(1) and 14, for example. Only the latter 
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Coroners Act is an attempt to sensitise coronial law and practice 
by accommodating, as far as it is reasonable to do so, the needs 
o f society's divergent ethnic and religious communities, the 
"family" should be used in its extended sense as including all 
who are related to the deceased by blood or marriage, as well as 
those people living within the immediate social household of the 
deceased even if not so related. A wider definition of "famili" 
might lead to more litigation than if a narrower one were 
adopted, but this should not be used as an argument for denying 
redress to meritorious claims. In any event, beyond the question 
o f standing there are numerous other obstacles to be overcome and 
which would have the effect of limiting spurious allegations. 
iii) The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 
Coroners who return incomplete bodies to Maori families may 
be breaching the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, thereby 
opening the possibility of a claim under section 6 of the Treaty 
o f Waitangi Act 1975. 98 The relevant parts of that s ection state 
t hat Maori who are (or are likely to be) prejudicially affected 
by any Act or any policy or practice adopted by or on behalf of 
t he Crown, which was or is inconsistent with the principles o f 
t he Treaty of Waitangi, may submit that claim to the Waitangi 
Tribunal. 
Although debate over the ramifications of the Treaty has 
f ocused primarily on land and other material resources, both 
Maori culture and social policy are "central and major 
t heme [ s] "99 of the Treaty. While this predominant focus is also 
phrase is statutorily defined but it is given a reasonably 
expansive meaning; sees 2. 
98 As amended bys 3(1) of the Treaty of Waitangi 
Amendment Act 1985. 
99 MH Durie "The Treaty of Waitangi: Perspectiv es on 
Soc ial Policy" in IH Kawharu Waitangi (OUP, Auckland, 1 989) 
280 , 280. 
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evident in the claims brought to the Wai tangi Tribunal for 
consideration, the Te Reo Maori claim provides a prominent 
exception and one that is highly pertinent to the present issue. 
In its report on that claim the Tribunal accepted that the 
phrase "O ratou taonga katoa'', found in Article II of the Maori 
text of the Treaty, is broader than the English equivalent "other 
properties", and includes both tangible and intangible 
things. 100 Having regard, as it must, 10 1 to the two texts, the 
Tribunal opted for the "broader perspective 11 102 since "the right 
t o use the Maori language would have been one of the rights 
expected to be covered by the Royal guarantee by those chiefs who 
s igned the Treaty" . 103 Thus, the Tribunal had little difficulty 
in finding that "[i]t is plain that the [Maori] language is an 
essential part of the culture and must be regarded as 'a valued 
possession'". 104 As a taonga, therefore, it enjoys the Treaty's 
protection. 
The tangihanga can equally be seen as a taonga coming within 
t he Treaty's protective ambit. It, more than anything else, 
symbolises the "nature of the Maori world view", 105 emphasises 
group solidarity and affirms central values, while o ffering a 
cathartic outlet for the grief, and reducing the supernatural 
fea r s , associated with death. 106 Described vari ously a s "the 
100 Wai tangi Tribunal Report of the Wai tangi Tribunal on 
the Te Reo Maori Claim (Wai 11) (2 ed, Department o f Justice, 
Wellington, 1989) 20. 
10 1 Section 5 (2) / Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. 
102 Above n 100, 21. 
103 Above n 100, 22. 
10 4 Above n 100, 20. 
105 RS Oppenheim Maori Death Customs (AH & AW Reed, New 
Zealand, 1973) 19. 
106 Above n 105, 20. 
most 'Maori' 
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gathering of all" 107 and "the 
ceremonial occasion", 108 the tangihanga survives, 
maJor Maori 
albeit "with 
many adaptions and changes in form ... with the same purpose and 
spirit as in the past" . 109 That is has so survived and developed 
"after the shock and disruption of more than 140 years of 
European contact, is indicative of its importance to Maori 
s ociety both in the past and in the present" . 110 Like te reo 
Maori, the right to observe the customary tangihanga would have 
been "one of the rights expected to be covered by the Royal 
guarantee by those chiefs who signed the Treaty". 111 
Although the Treaty of Waitangi Act refers to 
i nconsistencies with the ''principles of the Treaty" and not to 
breaches of its express provisions, one of those principles is 
t hat the Crown will keep the promises that it undertook when it 
s igned the covenant. This principle is implicit in the Waitangi 
Tribunal's support of the Te Reo Maori claim and has found more 
explicit expression in the Court of Appeal's characterisation of 
the Treaty as a partnership creating "responsibilities analogous 
t o fiduciary duties" 1 1 2 and requiring "each party to act 
reasonably and in good faith" . 113 Such onerous requirements do 
not easily allow the breaking of promises. 
It remains to be shown that coronial law and practice 
prejudicially affects Maori. It is submitted that this occurs 
107 A Salmond Hui: A Study of Maori Ceremonial Gatherings 
(AH & AW Reed, New Zealand, 1975) 180. 
108 H Dansey "A View of Death" in M King (ed) Te Ao 
Hurihuri The World Moves On (Hick Smith & Sons Ltd, New 
Zealand, 1975) 173, 180. 
109 Above n 108, 180. 
110 Above n 105, 123. 
11 1 Above n 100, 20. 
112 Per Cooke P in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-
General [1987) 1 NZLR 641, 664. 
113 Per Richardson J, above n 112, 673. 
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when coroners retain body parts causing "unnecessary" disruption 
to, or interference with, the tangihanga ceremony, since the 
"recognition and protection" 1 14 guaranteed to the ceremony as a 
taonga is denied. 
It is important here to clarify what is meant by 
"unnecessary". It has already been established that when the 
state's interest to ascertain the precise cause of all deaths 
collides with the Maori interest to observe their cultural 
dictates, some compromise must be made. Such compromise is 
inherent in the Treaty of Wai tangi " [ t] he parties owe each 
other co-operation". 115 Thus, Maori accept the legitimacy of 
coronial post-mortems to determine the cause of death when it is 
otherwise unexplained but do so on the understanding that the 
s tate undertakes its inquiries with reasonable speed and with as 
little interference to the deceased as possible. Since, in those 
s ituations where examination of a deceased' s brain tissue is 
required, it is possible to adopt procedures so that retention 
o f the brain is confined to no more than fi v e days, any l onger 
delay would be an unnecessary disruption of the tangihanga and 
therefore would be in breach of the principles o f the Treaty o f 
Waitangi. 
In summary, a coroner who retains a body part o f a Maori 
deceased, thereby unnecessarily delaying that person's 
t angihanga, is prejudicially affecting the family of the deceased 
and acting inconsistently with the principles of the Treaty o f 
Waitangi. This is so unless the part retained is the brain or the 
heart, in which case post-mortem procedures should be adapted in 
order to keep delay to a minimum. Failure to adopt those 
procedures, where possible, is also a breach of the Treaty's 
11 4 Above n 100, 23. 
115 Per Cooke P, above n 112, 666. 
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principles . 11 6 
It would be imprudent to dismiss any finding of the Waitangi 
Tribunal on the basis that the Tribunal's powers are 
recommendatory only. Its decisions may be bereft of direct legal 
consequences 117 but they are charged, at the very least, with a 
symbolic significance that cannot comfortably be ignored or 
overridden. As a Treaty partner the Crown ' s role is "not merely 
passive but extends to active protection to the fullest 
extent practicable". 118 The Court of Appeal has opined that: 119 
if the Waitangi Tribunal finds merit in a claim and 
recommends redress , the Crown should grant some form of 
redress , unless there a re grounds justifying a 
reasonable Treaty pa rt ner in withholdi ng it - which 
would only be in very special circumstances , if ever . 
V OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
i) Some Pr eliminary Consider at i ons 
It has been widely acknowledged that much of the anxiety and 
distress over the retention of body parts have their source in 
unsatisfactory communication between the parties working within, 
116 A similar claim could be made on the basis of the dead 
body as a taonga which should not be interfered with by the 
performance of unnecessary post-mortems or the unnecessary 
retention of body parts. 
117 Except in the limited circumstances as provided for by 
t he Treaty of Waitangi (State Services) Act 1988. 
118 Per Cooke P, above n 112, 664. 
119 Per Cooke P, above n 112, 664-665. 
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and affected by, the coronial system. 12° For example, the Act 
does not require coroners to tell the family of a deceased if 
parts are to be retained. Indeed, media reports have indicated 
t hat it is often left to the whim of funeral directors to 
disclose that information. 121 
In response to this specific problem the Minister of Justice 
has proposed the introduction of regulations which would require 
"pathologists performing post-mortem examinations to advise 
coroners why body parts need to be retained, and for how 
long" . 122 The coroner would then be required to relay that 
information directly to the family within 48 hours. 123 
The Minister has also reiterated a call for the appo intment 
o f Maori coroners in the hope that that would a ssist in 
s ensitising the coronial system to the needs of Maori. 124 Whil e 
t he fact of being Maori could not enable a coroner to work 
outside the strictures of the statute, it would bring the 
practical and important benefit of greater liaison a nd 
communication with Maori families struck by a bereavement. In 
t urn, Maori are likely to feel less alienated by, and feel less 
120 See, eg, transcript of National Radi o 's 
Report" programme 2YA, 7:08 a.m., 6 March 1992, 
"Morning 
6 . 
121 See, eg, "Maori push claim for own coroner" The 
Evening Post Wellington, New Zealand, 3 March, 1992. 
122 Above n 23. However, the regulation-making power 
conferred bys 45 of the Coroners Act does not cover t he 
Minister's proposed regulations. Nevertheless, administrativ e 
fo rms have been prepared and the Minister has "suggested" that 
t hey be used nationwide. Form 3 provides notice to the 
deceased's immediate family that a body organ has been 
r etained for further examination. Significantly, the 
Minister's direction is that "[t]his notification is t o be 
us ed only when a body organ is retained and the body is 
available for release but not otherwise" (original emphasis); 
see Memorandum To All Coroners (undated, on file). 
123 Above n 23. 
124 See, eg, "Graham wants Maori coroner" The New Zealand 
Her al d Auckland, New Zealand, 6 March 1992. 
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hostility towards, a system in which they have some measure of 
input and control. It is essential, however, that everyone 
participating in the coronial system, including the pathologists 
performing the autopsies and the police, be aware of, and 
actively respect to the extent that it is reasonable to do so, 
the cultural and religious needs of all bereaving families. 
Problems will recur so long as one weak link along the coronial 
chain remains. 
If implemented, these recommendations would go a 
considerable way in eliminating deficiencies within the present 
system . However, they do not directly address the issue of 
unnecessary retention; more is needed, it is submitted, than 
simply improving the flow of information and facilitating 
communication. 
When coroners retain body parts the crux of the issue will 
be: is the retention of the parts (causing the withholding of the 
body) "necessary"? To answer this question the exercise of the 
coroner's discretion to withhold the body must be reviewed. 
Amidst the shock and grief of a death this is a daunting and 
distressing task for a family to undertake. It is made all the 
more difficult in that section 14 of the Coroners Act provides 
no guidance as to what "necessary" entails. A family is thereby 
placed in something of an informational vacuum while the position 
of the coroner - in the event of questions being asked about 
decisions that have been made - is effectively bolstered. 
Admittedly, section 10 ( 3) of the Coroners Act enables a 
family to be represented by a doctor at a post-mortem examination 
but this provision is insufficient to overcome the imbalance that 
exists between the coroner's office and the public. Firstly, the 
Act makes such representation dependent upon the coroner's 
authorisation . Secondly, there is no obligation on the coroner 
to inform the family of the right to apply for representation, 
only an obligation to inform it of the decision to authorise a 
post-mortem and the reasons for that decision. Thirdly, even if 
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aware of the right, the family remains at an institutional 
disadvantage, unable to seek answers to questions that it may 
have without total reliance on the advice of medical 
professionals, the coroner and probably lawyers as well. In 
short, the Act succeeds, albeit passively, in disempowering the 
family rather than actively enabling family members to partake 
meaningfully in, and perhaps exercise some control over, any 
review procedure. 
It is submitted that it is desirable and important for the 
Coroners Act to provide this element of family input and control. 
If the Act is truly to overcome the "unnecessary hurt, 
bitterness , and sadness" 125 that families have suf f erect in the 
past then they should be able, and encouraged, to act upon more 
than mere suspicion or intuition. This is not to suggest that a 
family would ever be able to conduct a review of a coroner's 
decisions on its own, without resort to those involved in the 
coronial process. Nor is it to exalt the position of bereaving 
families so that their needs override the state's legitimate 
interests to determine the cause of death where uncertainty 
exists. It is to recognise, however, the unavoidable social, 
cultural and spiritual ramifications of the coroner's work and, 
in light of that, to advocate a more balanced relationship 
between the family of a deceased and the coroner's office. To 
promote the review of the decision-making process when there is 
delay is consistent with one of the broad aims of the Coroners 
Act - to ensure the prompt release of bodies. To promote the role 
of families in this review procedure is also consistent with a 
legal system purportedly built on the ideals of natural justice. 
To the extent that the provision of information is an 
effective way of empowering people, this could be achieved by 
undertaking an educational 
explained to the public at 
and informational programme that 
large the theory and practice of 
coroners ' work. Once more, however, it is submitted that this 
125 Hon. Peter Tapsell, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 
Vol 490, 1988: 5160. 
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would not be enough and that further measures would be needed. 
Various options are sketched below to redress the issue of 
t he unnecessary retention of body parts. The extent to which they 
r edress the imbalance that exists between the family of a 
deceased and the coroner, and his or her agents, is also 
considered in the discussion. Firstly, however, it is worth 
no ting that if the interpretation of "body" that is argued for 
i n this paper is not accepted the need for reform of the Coroners 
Ac t is perhaps even greater. If, for example, a coroner is 
entitled to retain body parts after the return of the rest of the 
body, the Act provides scant, if any, opportunity for a family 
to question that decision. The point is that in this scenario 
section 14 governing the early release of bodies would appear not 
to apply since the "body" has already been returned, leaving 
l ittle else upon which to hang a challenge o f the coroner's 
ac tions. The options for reform that follow are therefore 
r elevant regardless of one's position in the preceding 
i nterpretation debate. 
ii) Control Over Post-mortem Examinations 
a) Statutory definition of post-mortem examination 
A definition of a post-mortem examination could be inserted 
i nto the Coroners Act setting out what a standard examination 
entails. Anything occurring beyond those statutory limits would 
only be permitted with the consent of the deceased's family. 126 
A possible definition would be: 
20 . 
(a) For the purposes of this Act a post-mortem examination 
means an external and internal examination of the body and 
the taking of such small samples of tissue and fluids as 
are necessary for microscopy and analysis in order to 
126 This suggestion was made by Dr Ken Thomson, above n 
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determine the cause or likely cause of death, or in order 
to exclude a cause, or causes, or a possible cause or 
possible causes, of death. 
(b) The retention of any tissue or fluid beyond that 
allowed by part (a) of this definition may only take place 
with the consent of the family of the deceased person. 
Such a definition is no more than the statutory expression of 
standard contemporary coronial practice, incorporating what is 
necessary in all, or virtually all, cases where a post-mortem 
examination is required for the cause of death to be precisely 
determined. It is difficult to conceive of a post-mortem that 
would require the taking of more tissue or fluids than that which 
this definition permits. It is submitted that the benefits that 
the definition brings should not be lost in order to rigorously 
but impractically accommodate logically possible but otherwise 
highly remote situations. 
The definition has the advantage of excluding the 
possibility of body parts being retained permanently (apart from 
the taking of small samples that the definition permits or unless 
consent has been given to do so). Permanent retention evidently 
has occurred on rare occasions 127 but in no case can this be 
said to be necessary for the performance of a post-mortem 
examination. The definition also clearly indicates to a family 
that only small body samples may be retained permanently and, 
therefore, that the non-return of a body organ is impermissible. 
If an incomplete body were returned this definition would provide 
a ready foundation upon which a family could begin to question 
a coroner's acts. 
On the other hand it would not, on its own , prevent the more 
likely scenario of prolonged, but not permanent, retention of a 
body part (so long as it was being retained for the taking of 
127 Above n 23. 
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samples allowed by the definition). To that end the Act could be 
further amended so that similar "sensitivity" considerations that 
already apply when a coroner decides whether or not to authorise 
a post-mortem examination, or whether or not to hold an inquest, 
also apply to the post-mortem examination itself. This could read 
a s : 
Without limiting the above definition of a post-mortem 
examination and so far as it is reasonable to ascertain 
them, a doctor performing a post-mortem examination shall, 
throughout the course of the examination and to the extent 
that it is reasonable to do so, respect the ethnic o rigins, 
social attitudes or customs, or spiritual beliefs of the 
dead person being examined and his or her immediate family. 
Although this provision raises the spectre of reasonableness 
and what that is to mean, in most cases its inclusion would have 
little additional practical ef feet. Doctors generally, after all, 
have a respect for deceased persons that is shared by all people 
and which they endeavour to incorporate in the performance of 
t heir work. Society's ethnic and religious groups, themselves, 
concede that the state has a legitimate interest in undertaking 
coronial post-mortems. However, lapses in sensitivity do occur, 
causing considerable emotional, cultural and religious 
dislocation. The legal system could play a role in preventing 
s uch lapses from recurring by requiring doctors, in those 
s ituations where it is known, or where it is reasonable to expect 
t he doctor to know, that a family has specific needs arising from 
particular beliefs, to accommodate these needs if it can be done 
without unduly fettering, or interfering with, their work. 128 
128 The recently enacted Mental Health (Compulsory 
Ass essment and Treatment) Act 1992 provides a useful statutory 
precedent for the application of similar considerations. Sees 
5 requiring all court or tribunal proceedings, and all powers, 
to be conducted or exercised under that Act with "proper 
r espect for the patient's cultural and ethnic identity, 
l anguage, and religious or ethical beliefs". 
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such a provision would require doctors performing post-mortems 
to have a "working knowledge" of the relevant cultural and 
spiritual values held by the various groups that make up the New 
Zealand community. Moreover, it would require a commitment to 
respect these values in their professional work. It would also 
require a doctor to consider making initial inquiries amongst the 
deceased' s family in order to determine whether any special needs 
do exist. In practice, it may be convenient - and "reasonable" 
in terms of the amendment - for such inquiries to be made by the 
coroner who would pass on the information to the doctor; 
129 it 
would be for the doctor, however, to exercise the discretion 
whether or not to adapt procedures on the basis of the 
information supplied. 
It should be noted that this "sensitivity" provision is 
phrased so as not to place limits on the preceding statutory 
definition of a post-mortem examination. Hence, the fact of 
taking tissue and fluids that come within the ambit of the 
"standard" post-mortem would be safe from attack for want of 
respect or sensitivity, although the manner in which they were 
taken could be so questioned, as could "non-standard" procedures. 
To provide an example, in a situation where the brain of a 
deceased Maori is required for further examination, this 
provision would imply that the pathologist should undertake the 
examination with appropriate speed so that the body can be 
returned as soon as possible to the family in accordance with 
Maori custom. More specifically, it would imply that in the 
absence of special pathological circumstances demanding the 
contrary, the brain should be set in extra-strength formalin in 
order to achieve rapid fixation within four or five days. 
Thereupon the necessary representative slices of tissue should 
129 The Coroners Act already envisages coroners making 
certain inquiries regarding a deceased's cause of death before 
deciding whether or not to authorise a post-mortem 
examination ; sees 8(a). It may be practical for the coroner 
to inquire into any special needs of the deceased's family 
regarding post-mortem examinations at the same time. 
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be taken and the body (including the brain) returned to the 
family. Where the ethnicity or religious values of the deceased 
are uncertain or unknown, however, the amendment's "reasonable 
inquiries" provision would suggest that the deceased's immediate 
family should be telephoned and asked if there are any relevant 
considerations to be taken into account in respect of the 
intended post-mortem examination. Where there is difficulty 
contacting the immediate family then the risk of delay impairing 
the accuracy of post-mortem results would begin to counter the 
reasonableness of consulting with the family. It would be for the 
pathologist to make a professional judgment of when the competing 
factors tip the balance and make further inquiries unreasonable. 
Together these suggested amendments to the Coroners Act 
would not have onerous effects upon coronial practice, yet they 
would improve the position of families with particular cultural 
or religious needs. Such families could not only expect more 
understanding treatment than perhaps they might have experienced 
in the past, they would also have a clearer picture of their 
rights, and therefore a better chance of enforcing them, than 
t hey do under the current regime. 
b) Code of practice for pathologists 
Rather than regulating the conduct of post-mortem 
examinations via statute, the definition of a standard 
examination and the sensitivity considerations that have been 
discussed above could be included in a code of practice governing 
pathologists. At present no written code exists. 
For a variety of reasons this would be a less desirable 
option to take but, in particular, families seeking to question 
aspects of a post-mortem examination could find the task more 
difficult if pathologists operated under a code of practice 
r ather than the suggested statutory amendments. Most importantly, 
it would be unlikely for a code to have universal coverage since, 
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although most doctors who perform coronial post-mortems are 
pathologists, the Coroners Act requires only that the examination 
be performed by a doctor, that is, "a registered medical 
practitioner" . 130 A pathologist, on the other hand, is a 
registered medical practitioner who specialises in pathological 
medicine. Therefore, not all doctors who perform post-mortems, 
or who are legally able to perform them, would be covered by the 
code. As a result families would be confronted with uncertainties 
and inconsistencies. Injustice would rightfully be felt if 
unnecessary delay of the return of a body part could not be 
questioned merely because the doctor who performed the post-
mortem was not a pathologist and therefore not subject to the 
code. Were the code voluntary rather than compulsory, its 
coverage would be potentially even less extensive, creating 
further disadvantage for families. 
It is probable that a code of practice would be a less 
visible and accessible document than the statute, causing 
difficulty for the public in acquainting themselves of their 
rights. Furthermore, from the family's point of view, a code's 
utility would depend considerably upon the remedies it contained 
for breaches of its rules, and their ease of enforceability. 
Issues such as standing and the appropriate forum for hearing 
allegations of breaches would have to be resolved. An advantage 
of adopting the statutory approach is that a ready-made procedure 
to appraise the exercise of a doctor's discretion already exists 
under judicial review proceedings. 
c) Employment contracts 
The employment contract between the coroner and the 
pathologist employed to perform coronial post-mortems could also 
be a vehicle for introducing the limits and controls that have 
been discussed. This approach could be favoured as an interim 
130 Section 2, Coroners Act 1988. 
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measure but unless identical contractual arrangements were 
adopted by all coroners and pathologists throughout the country 
inconsistency and uncertainty would again arise. Moreover, such 
contracts would not be available for public scrutiny and, even 
i f there were general knowledge of their existence and contents, 
t he doctrine of privity of contract would cause significant 
difficulties for anyone but the coroner to enforce what rights 
t he contract bestowed. 
d) Summary 
Although not an exhaustive analysis of all the merits and 
ramifications of each proposal, the above discussion suggests 
that an amendment to the Coroners Act would be the most effective 
way of placing reasonable controls on coronial post-mortems in 
order to prevent the unnecessary retention of body parts. Not 
only would the statutory approach cover all doctors performing 
post-mortems, it is the option which does the most to serve the 
legitimate interests of families who have questions to ask. 
iii) Amending the "No-Property" Rule 
Just as English Common Law recognises no property in whol e 
living human bodies, 131 it has "permitted this rule t o 
survive the death of the person in question"; 132 it is 
consequently said that there can be no larceny or theft o f a 
corpse. 133 The bald simplicity of the "no-property " rule i s 
13 1 1 Hawkins PC 148. 
132 ATH Smith "Stealing the Body and its Parts" [1976] 
Criminal Law Review 622, 623. 
133 But note an inadvertent inroad into this rule in two 
r oad-traffic cases concerning body parts or bodily products 
f rom living people; see R v Welsh [1974] RTR 478 and R v 
Rothery [1976] RTR 550 in which the defendants were 
respectively convicted of the theft of urine and blood samples 
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11 mis leading", 134 however. It has already been shown, for 
example, that English civil law recognises and protects certain 
possessory rights over dead bodies so that, as one commentator 
has put it : 13 5 
[t]he executor (or other person having possession of 
the corpse) has ' property ' in it for r.he purpose of 
proprietary remedies, at least to the exr.ent that the 
law recognises, as incidental tor.he duty to dispose of 
the body, rights to the possession of the body until it 
is disposed of. 
Other jurisdictions have been less willing to follow a 
strict "no-property" rule. In Missouri the right to the 
possession of the body for burial has been judicially described 
as a "quasi-property right", 136 meaning that "' possession for 
commercial purposes was still denied'". 137 In Canada a trust 
analogy has been applied: 138 
[I]nasmuch as there is a legally recognised right of 
custody , control , and disposition, the essential 
attribute of ownership, ... it would be more accurate 
which they had provided for the police. 
134 P Mathews "Whose Body? People As Property" (1983) 36 
Current Legal Problems 193. Mathews also describes it as an 
"embarrassment", and possibly "quite misconceived" (at p 193) 
135 Above n 132, 624. 
136 Patrick v Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co et al 118 
SW 2d 116 (1938), 122. 
137 TH Murray "On the Human Body as Property: The Meaning 
of Embodiment, Markets, and the Meaning of Strangers" (1987) 
20 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 1055, 1070. 
See also Larson v Chase 50 NW 238 (1891), 239 (Minnesota). 
138 Miner v Canadian Pacific R.W. Co 15 WLR 161 (1910), 
167 (Alberta). A trust analogy was also used in Pierce v 
Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery 10 RI 227 (1872), cited in 
Mathews above n 134, 201. However, there the court's reference 
was to a "sacred trust", indicating, perhaps, that the court 
was merely drawing a useful, but loose, analogy with trust 
law. If property in a corpse is really subject to a trust then 
actions for breach of fiduciary duty may lie. 
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to say that the law recog n ises property in a corpse , 
but property subject to a trust , and limited i n i ts 
rights to such exercise as shall be in conf ormity with 
the duty out of which the rights arise. 
A further inroad into the "no-property" rule in relation to 
dead bodies is to be found in the Australian case of Doodeward 
v Spence. 139 There the corpse in question was that of a 
st illborn child with two heads which had been kept, preserved in 
a bottle of spirits, by the doctor of the dead child's mother. 
Rega rdless of any legal rule to the contrary, the background to 
the litigation indicates that the corpse was treated as if it 
were at least de facto property, it having been sold by auction 
to t he plaintiff's father, from whom it passed t o the p l a intiff. 
The majority of the High Court o f Australia, however, were 
wi lling to treat the corpse in this instance as the sub j e c t o f 
property not just in fact but in law. Acco rding t o Gr i f fiths CJ 
there was no doubt that: 140 
when a person has by the lawful exercise of work or 
sk i ll so dealt with a human body or part of a human 
body in his lawful possession that it has acquired some 
attributes differentiating it from a mere corpse 
a waiting burial, he acquires a right to retain 
possession of it, at least as against any person not 
entitled to have it delivered to him for the purpose of 
burial . . . . 
Fur t hermore, his Honour stated: 141 
139 
140 
I do not know of any definition of property which is 
not wide enough to include such a right of permanent 
possession . By whatever name the right is called , I 
t h i nk it ex i sts, and that , so far as it constitutes 
property, a human body, or a portion of a human body, 
is capable by law of becoming the subject of property. 
(1908) 6 CLR 406 . 
Above n 139, 414. 
141 Above n 13 9, 414 . 
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Scots law also provides an alternativ e to the strict "no -
property" rule. In Dewar v HM Advocate142 Lord Moncrieff clearly 
stat ed, a lbeit in obiter dicta, that: 143 
a body that has been consigned for burial cases ceases 
to be subject to thefc only when incermenc is complece; 
and if the doctrine is now to be applied in the case of 
a body consigned for cremacion, I think that the proper 
parallel would be that theft should be regarded as 
having ceased to be practicable once the body has been 
enclosed in the furnace. It is when a step has 
conclusively been taken to set agoing the process of 
d i sso l ut i on of the bodies of the dead that the law 
ceases to protect the body from aces of theft. 
The responses of the varying jurisdiction s outlined above 
show that the "no-property" rule in respect of dead b odie s is no t 
unassailable. Not having already decided the p o int, t here i s no 
necessity for the New Zealand courts to assiduously f o llow the 
s trictness of the English approach, at least in respect of 
unburied bodies. 14 4 Notions of property could be extende d to 
dead bodies and body parts by recognising a property interest in 
a dead body which vests "in the executors, or whoever e l se i s now 
under the duty to dispose of [the c orpse] and has a right to 
pos session for that purpose". 145 Legal limits c ould be 
consciously applied to the property interest to prevent what 
might be considered to be far-reaching a nd undesirable 
142 1945 Scots Law Times 114. 
143 Above n 142, 116. 
14 4 Arguably buried corpses, or corpses dispersed 
fo llowing cremation, are adequately protected by existing 
s tatutory rules. For example, s 51 of the Burial and Cr emation 
Ac t 1964 renders it unlawful to remove any body o r the r emains 
of a body from its burial place without a licence. Section 
150(b) of the Crimes Act 1961 makes it a criminal offence to 
i mproperly or indecently interfere with, or offer any 
i ndignity to, any dead human body or human remains , whether 
buried or not. 
145 PDG Skegg "Human Corps es, Medical Specimens and the 
Law o f Property" (1975) 4 Anglo-American Law Review 412, 417. 
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consequences the possibility of corrunercial transactions 
involving the human body, for example, or the possibility of 
testamentary dispositions of bodies. This could be achieved 
simply by treating the property interest in the corpse "as one 
which could not be divested". 14 6 
In terms of policy considerations there are several reasons 
that would justify New Zealand's courts treating corpses and body 
parts as the subject of property so that actions for theft could 
lie in respect of them. From a purely legal viewpoint it is 
anomalous for the civil law to recognise property in a corpse -
a lbeit a limited recognition - but for the criminal law to refuse 
to do so . 147 From a practical viewpoint, it would have the 
advantage of affording considerable protection to bodies and body 
parts used in medical research and teaching and increasingly in 
transplantation operations. While these areas may well be the 
more important beneficiaries of any amendment to the "no-
property" rule in New Zealand, it is submitted that to recognise 
property in dead bodies and body parts would also, if only 
incidentally and on rare occasions, provide a further means of 
preventing coroners from wrongfully retaining body parts and 
provide some redress where they do. In particular, this 
development of the law would be of use in situations where body 
parts (excluding those tissue and fluid samples which may be 
l egitimately kept by the pathologist for analysis) are retained 
permanently. In such a case, the law of theft may operate so as 
to enable the return of the missing part either before or after 
t he burial of the corpse and to punish the offender . 
That New Zealand's courts should not feel constrained from 
dev eloping their own response to the question of property in dead 
bodies is strengthened by the fact that the English "no - property" 
r ule is based on scant authority and largely unexplained or 
14 6 Above n 145, 417. 
147 Above n 132, 625. 
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erroneous rationale. 148 The rule appears to originate, for 
example, from the writings of Coke who stated that "' [t]he burial 
of the Cadaver (that is, caro data vermibus) is nullius in bonus, 
and belongs to Ecclesiastical cognizance'". 149 Coke did not say, 
however, that corpses could never be the subject of property; 
rather, his comments were directed at 
consecrated ground. 150 Moreover, "the fact 
corpses buried in 
that corpses buried 
in consecrated ground were the subject of ecclesiastical 
cognizance, was hardly a good reason for regarding them as 
nulli us in bonus at common law" 151 since other objects which are 
also the subject of ecclesiastical law do fall within the Common 
Law's protection. 152 From these uncertain origins the "no-
property" rule has 
unalterable truth 1115 3 
thus "assumed 
in English law, 
the proportions 
despite making 
of 
up 
an 
the 
ratio decidendi of only two English cases, 154 both of which have 
been criticised, perhaps with fatal effect. 155 
Amending the "no-property" rule as suggested above could 
also be achieved by legislative action. For several reasons such 
148 Above n 134, 198. 
14 9 Cited in Mathews, above n 134, 198. See also Skegg 
above n 145, 412. 
150 Above n 145, 412. According to Coke's reasoning, 
corpses buried in unconsecrated ground, and therefore not 
protected by ecclesiastical law, would not be covered by the 
"no-property" rule. See also above n 134, 198. 
151 Above n 145, 412. 
152 For example, monuments and church fabric. Above n 145, 
412 and above n 134, 198. 
153 Above n 132, 624. 
15 4 Dr Handyside's case, above n 56; and Williams v 
Williams, above n 46. 
1 5 5 See Mathews above n 134, 209-210, for a commentary on 
Dr Handyside's case. In fact, after considerable historical 
research, Mathews claims that (at p 210): "it is not a 
decision on the point [ie, the "no-property" rule], let alone 
one binding the courts to follow it". For a commentary on 
Williams v Williams see Skegg, above n 145, 416. 
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a course may well be preferable. Firstly, unless the issue is 
brought before the court for determination judicial development 
of the law cannot occur. Secondly, even if a case is brought 
before the court the particular facts may not allow for a full 
and authoritative explication of principle. If the law is to 
develop in this area then it is submitted that it ought to do so 
comprehensively and with 
commercial transactions, 
beginning. Thirdly, the 
the necessary safeguards (preventing 
for instance) in place from the 
judiciary may be inhibited by 
conservatism or inertia and choose not to amend the "no-property" 
rule. Fourthly, given the moral and emotional significance of the 
subject-matter, there may be merit in promoting wider public 
debate about, and seeking the public's input into, the suggested 
r eforms. In particular, such development of the law may have 
ramifications for ethnic or religious minorities, as well as for 
t he medical profession, that should be considered. 156 
VI CONCLUSION 
The funeral and burial customs of all people are not just 
a ritualised means of disposal but are effectively "a 
commemoration of a life" and "an occasion to reassure and re-
es tablish the social group" . 157 Against this heady background of 
i ntense emotion, and perhaps sudden cultural and religious 
po larisation, the coroner cuts a potentially abrasive wound when 
he or she authorises a post-mortem examination. The enactment of 
the 1988 Coroners Act was in many ways a commendable and 
156 For example, enabling prosecutions for the theft of a 
corpse may impact negatively upon Maori custom which not 
uncommonly gives rise to disputes over the place of burial of 
a deceased. Such disputes are in fact a manifestation of aroha 
f or the deceased (above n 105, 22) and reflect the dead 
person's mana. Although in theory the law already favours one 
party's position in such disputes by upholding rights to the 
possession of a corpse for the purpose of burial, any further 
intervention of the law may be seen as unwelcome. 
157 C Nathan "Ethical and Legal Aspects to Death: The 
Burial" (1989) 8 Medicine and Law 455. 
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sa tisfactory palliative but it appeared to overlook the even 
deeper wound inflicted when the decision to retain body parts is 
made. 
A central issue in this paper has been an interpretational 
debate as to whether the Coroners Act actually allows coroners 
to return incomplete bodies to families, whilst retaining body 
organs. The answer that has been proffered is that they may not, 
but irrespective of the ultimate determination of this point, 
there is a need to tackle the unnecessary retention of body parts 
however it may occur. In considering the issues it has been an 
underlying premise of this paper that the competing rights of the 
state and families must give way to compromise. Evidence 
suggests, however, that in practice families are sometimes the 
ones forced to yield the most, placed as they are in an 
ins titutional, and often cultural, imbalance with the coroner's 
off i c e. Possible ways o f addressing that imbalance have been 
canvassed herein; to categorise them broadly they either modify 
coronial law and practice, or they attempt to empower families 
by p roviding them with a means of challenging decisions when they 
fee l that have been wrongly aggrieved. Some do both, directly or 
indirectly. 
Society ignores its untreated maladies at its peril . Given 
that the retention o f body parts is causing members o f the 
community considerable anguish and concern, it i s hoped that t he 
problem will not be ignored by those with the ability to tackle 
it . It has been an aim of this paper to show that at least s ome 
of t he power to do this resides with the families themselv es, but 
thi s requires sufficient will and resources to engage the aid of 
the legal system . Furthermore, there are many potential barriers 
to s uccess . Unless and until the coronial system also concedes 
some o f its power an unequal balance i s likely to remain and the 
anguish shall continue. 
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APPENDIX: Parts I and III of the Coroners Act 1988 
1988, No. 111 Coroners 
PART I 
PRELIMINARY 
997 
1. Short Title and commencement-( 1) This Act may be 
cited as the Coroners Act 1988. 
(2) This Act shall come into force on the 1st day of January 
1989. 
2. _Interpretation-In this Act, unless the context otherwise 
requrres,-
"Body" means a dead person, and includes-
(a) Any part of a person without which no person 
can live; and 
(b) Any part of a person discovered in such 
circumstances or such a state that it is probable that 
the person is dead,-
whether or not the identity of the person concerned is 
known when the part is discovered or is later 
determined; but does not include a foetus or a still· 
born child: 
"Death", in relation to reporting to a member of the 
Police, a Justice, or a coroner, includes the finding of 
a body: 
"Disposal", in relation to a body, means burial or 
cremation; and includes all other lawful modes of 
disposing of a body; and "to dispose of" has a 
corresponding mearung: 
"Doctor" means a registered medical practitioner: 
"Immediate family", in relation to any person, includes 
persons whose relationship to the person is, or is 
through one or more relationships that are, that of 
de-facto spouse, step-child, step-parent, step-brother, 
or step-sister: 
"Irrecoverable" means impossible or impracticable to 
recover: 
"New Zealand" includes the Ross Dependency: 
"Secretary" means the Secretary for Justice. 
Cf. 1951, No. 73, s. 2 
8. Act binds the Crown-This Act binds the Crown. 
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PART III 
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATIONS 
7. Coroner may authorise examination-With the 
authority of a coroner, a doctor (not being a doctor who, to the 
coroner s knowledge, attended the person concerned 
immediately before death) may-
(a) For the purpose of enabling the coroner to decide 
whether or not to hold an inquest into the death 
concerned; or 
(b) Where the coroner-
(i) Is to hold an inquest into the death; or 
(ii) Has opened and not completed an inquest into 
the death,-
perform a post-mortem examination of the body concerned; 
and in that case, the doctor shall give the coroner a written 
report on the results of the examination. 
Cf. 1951, No. 73, ss. 6 (1), 10 (1) 
8. Decision whether or not to authorise examination-
In deciding whether or not to authorise a doctor to perform a 
post-mortem examination, a coroner shall have regard to: the 
following matters: ; 
(a) The extent to which the matters required by this Act to 
be established at inquests-
(i) Are not already disclosed in respert of the death 
concerned by information available directly to the 
coroner or from information arising from inquiries or 
examinations the coroner has made or caused to be 
made; but 
(ii) Are likely to be disclosed by a post-mortem 
examination; and 
(b) Whether or not the death appears to have been 
unnatural; and 
(c) If the death appears to have been unnatural or violent, 
whether or not it appears to have been due to the 
actions or inaction of other persons; and 
(d) The existence and extent of any allegations, rumours, 
suspicions, or public concern about the cause of the 
death; and 
(e) The desirability of minimising the causing of distress to 
persons who, by reason of their ethnic origins, social 
attitudes or customs, or spiritual beliefs, customarily 
require bodies to be available to family members as 
soon as is possible after death; and 
(D The desirability of minimising the causing of offence to 
persons who, by reason of their ethnic origins, social 
attitudes or customs, or spiritual beliefs, find the post· 
mortem examination of bodies offensive; and 
(g) The desire of any member of the immediate family of the 
person concerned that a post-mortem examination 
should be performed; and 
(h) Any other matters the coroner thinks relevant. 
Cf. 1951, No. 73, ss. 6 (1), 10 (1) 
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9. Early performance of examination-( 1) A coroner 
who-
(a) Has authorised a doctor to perform a post-mortem 
examination of a person's body; and 
(b) Is satisfied that subsection (2) of this section applies to the 
pers~m or to a member of the person's immediate 
family.-
shall direct the doctor to perform it forthwith; and in that case 
the doctor shall do so. 
(2) This subsection applies to a person if persons having the 
ethnic origins, social attitudes or customs, or spiritual beliefs of 
the person customarily require bodies to be available to family 
members as soon as is possible after death. 
10. Observers at examinations-(1) A doctor who 
attended a person before death mar be present at any post-
mortem examination of the person s body authorised under 
this Act. 
(2) A coroner may, by notice in 1,vriting to a doctor who 
attended a person before death, require the doctor to do either 
or both of t~e following: 
(a) Be present at a post-mortem examination of the person's 
body authorised by the coroner under this Act: 
(b) Give the coroner a report (containing information 
specified in the notice) relating to the person. 
(3) Any doctor may, with the authority of a coroner granted 
on the application of any person, be present as the person's 
representative at a post-mortem examination authorised by the 
coroner under this Act. 
(4) Any doctor may, with the authority of a coroner, be 
present as the coroner's observer at a post-mortem 
examination authorised by the coroner tmder this Act. 
(5) Any member of the Police may be present at a post· 
mortem examination authorised under this Act. 
Cf. 1951, No. 73, ss. 6 (1), 9, 10 (1) 
11. Family to be notified-(1) A coroner who has 
authorised a doctor to perform a post-mortem examination 
shall, as soon as is practicable after doing so, take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that there is given to a member of the 
immediate family of the person concerned notice-
(a) That the performance of an examination has been 
authorised; and 
(b) Of the coroner's reasons for authorising it; and 
(c) That a copy of the doctor's report can be obtained under 
subsection (2) of this section. 
(2) Where a coroner-
(a) Has authorised a doctor to perform a post-mortem 
examination of a person's body; and 
(b) Has possession of the doctor's report,-
any member of the person's family may (without charge), after 
the expiration of 7 days after the completion of the 
examination, obtain a copy of the report from the coroner. 
(3) A failure to comply with subsection ( 1) of this section does 
not affect the validity of any action. 
52 
12. Other inquiries and examinations-A coroner may 
cause to be made any inquiries or examinations, or commission 
any reports, (medical or otherwise), the coroner thinks 
proper-
(a) For the purpose of deciding whether or not to hold an 
inquest; or 
(b) Where the coroner is to hold an inquest or has opened 
and not completed one. 
Cf.1951, No. 73, s. 10(4) 
18. Removal and disposal ofbodies-(1) For the purposes 
of any examination under this Act, a coroner may give any 
directions the coroner thinks fit relating to the removal of a 
body. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3) of this section, a coroner to 
whom a death has been reported may at any time, by written 
notice in the prescribed form signed by the coroner, authorise 
the disposal of the body concerned; and the body may be 
disposed of accordingly. 
(3) A coroner who decides not' to authorise a doctor to 
per(orm a post-mortem examination of a body shall not 
authorise its disposal earlier than 24 hours after notifying a 
member of the Police of the decision, unless a member of the 
Police of the rank of Senior Sergeant or above agrees. 
Cf.1951, No. 73, ss. 10(5), 11 
14. Early release of bodies-Subject to section 13 (3) of 
this Act, as soon as a coroner is satisfied that it is no longer 
necessary to withhold a body from family members, the 
coroner shall forthwith authorise its disposal. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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